"For the silent majority of the world, the makers of history also live in history and the defiance of history begins not so much with an alternative history as with the denial of history as an acreage of human certitude." - Nandy
'History' is fascinating, but the logic of history, some would say, makes it more amenable to imperialistic ambitions. For that matter, 'a chronological sequencing of events' which marks a clear distinction between past, present and future (in essence, an idea of progress) is one of the more celebrated after-effects of enlightenment. Hegel, Marx and many other prophets of the enlightenment era have used an abused history to museumize the past,justify the present and fix the future. And that is why, Nandy thinks that the project of 'alternative histories' is not as emancipating as it seems. For him, it is in the denial of history and celebration of many other alternate forms of telling the past, i.e. folk, myth, and so on, that the silent majority of the world find their ultimate calling.
These alternate forms of recounting the past do two things, which history suppresses. First, they provide us with an alternate idea of time. The past, present and future, thus, are not sequentially separated. The lines between the three are blurred, even some times fusing into one. That means the past is not always objectified, something that is there. It is always in the making. And thus, more closer to the present. Similarly, future is not always pre-fixed, not completely in the hands of past and present and thus the driver of both, 'Man' (Of course, not 'woman'). Future has its own latency, its own subjectivities, its own uncertainities and depends more on an active collaboration of 'nature' and 'human' rather than just the latter.
Secondly, these alternate forms of recounting past are moral/ethical and not amorally and dispassionately chronicled. The message upfront that these forms convey is explicitly moral. Their affect on present and future is not determinative but suggestive. The history though has a determinative role. History in fact follows a telos, whose every point seems to be pre-defined, not just the end. Of course, sometimes myths and folks also point to a telos, as in Armageddon, or circularity in lfe, as in Hindu mythology (rebirth, but it also has a telos in 'Moksha), but the end is just a 'pointer' which keeps one reminded of what 'one ought to do' but not necessarily what 'one would do'. These forms, in a sense, try to locate 'moral and reason' in an active connivance and not in passive divergence.
Of course, the idea is not to eulogise myth and folk, and such forms. They have their own drawbacks. May be others could pitch in here.
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But even if we were to deny history to accept a more dynamic conceptualization of past still the question of subjectivities of the past remains unaddressed. For I think we will not disagree that past too is variegated and diverse for the diverse people that inhabit the world. Moreover, does past also not have its latency or potentiality that influence our present and future (because of the dynamism that connects past to present to future)? And if it does then I would think that for those of us who challenge present structures will not benefit from recounting only myths and folk. Though it is important to be critical of the modern disciplines that compartmentalize and restrict our knowledge and imagination, yet, your piece seems to romanticize the reproduction of some highly hierarchical, exploitative and problematic relationships and social structures. Maybe if you could elaborate further...
ReplyDeleteMay be I put too much of a stress on 'alternate forms of recounting past', the skepticism to which is justified as you point out. The idea, however, is not to completely discard history, for that would tantamount to another 'imperialism' (too cliche a word to use, but couldn't think of a better one)...the idea is also not to completely fictionalize past..the effort is merely to make past more 'plural', and that doesn't necessary mean making it relative. Past does influence our present and future and that is why I guess we are so much interested in 'studying/reading' it. The point that I raise however is that 'historicising the past' or making it a domain of one particular epistemological enquiry that makes it look deterministic ought to be problematised. It strange, and also unfortunate, that while most modern disciplines of social knowledge have had streams of self-criticality, history has produced none. In fact, a major enterprise of history has been of self-praise in terms of the ‘end of history’ (history being determinative), visibly manifest in historical consciousness of people from as diverse persuasions as Hegel, Marx and Francis Fukuyama. There have been efforts and powerful pleas for alternative histories, none for alternatives to history. Even when there is a fair understanding that history is only one way of constructing the past, and different cultures have had their own different ways of doing it. This I guess happens because history of the subaltern cannot be a 'history' for the ontology of history does not permit that. The marginalized have always been made to live outside of history. They are ‘ahistorical’. Steadfastly tied to the ideas of sequencing, progress, scienticism, secularism and cause and effect, history has inbuilt tools of taming the past. George Orwell said once, ‘those who own the past own the present’, and consequently, if I may add, the future. Talking about the subaltern who seems inconsequential, powerless, pre-scientific and primitive from within the history pits history against its own self. There have been efforts though, most fascinating being the ‘South Asian Subaltern Studies’ by Ranajit Guha et al. But I feel they stand crippled from the start for they fight their own existentiality. Not surprisingly, this literature finds a more encouraging use in the reference manuals of anthropology and not history.
ReplyDeleteAbout romanticizing other forms, though I shall be very conscious of claims by these other forms, I may not exactly buy the argument that these forms are any more ‘hierarchical, exploitative or problematic’ than what history is. The twentieth century by any standards was bloodier than any other epoch in human history. 210 million people died in intra-state violence alone, discounting the world wars. The Stalins, the Hitlers who were at the architects of this danse macabre used the argument of ‘rationalized history’ to do that. And similar instances are copious. Millions die and several million more suffer, even today, under the ‘historicised developmentalism’ of state.
The other, may I just add, do not remain restricted to folk and myth. I think ‘arts’ and ‘fiction’ can also be a wonderful form of constructing past. That aside though, my argument for bringing in these alternate forms was for the sake of what Nandy calls ‘moral certitude’ and not ‘objectivist or empirical certitude’. He elaborates further by saying that ‘history gives moral certitude and guides moral action by paradoxically denying a moral framework and giving an objectivist framework based on supposedly empirical realities’. He continues, ‘History thus allows one to identify with its secular trends and give a moral stature to the inevitable in the future.’ And here lies the problem. While these alternate forms invoke morality to guide human action to a better future, history invokes morality to justify it.
All thanks to Vineet for inaugurating the forum on such an interesting note. Indeed, so interesting and deserving of thought, that I am enticed to join in without any preliminary familiarity with the text being discussed.
ReplyDeleteVineet sums it up very well. The imperialism of history has rightly attracted the attention of post-modernists like Nandy who are interested in uncovering the “epistemic violence” implicit in all academic “disciplines”. To the post-modernist/post-structuralist, history- like everything else, is based on narratives which involves language, and therefore can be/should be deconstructed. The historian then is the ‘reader’ of the past who also engages in prescribing how the past should be read. Although the objectivity of history had already come under question in the relativism of the 1930s, a post-modern critique of history brought in elements of a more radical critique of narratives/meta-narratives. Acknowledging the impossibility of incorporating ‘other histories’ into the academic fold of the discipline as it is traditionally understood, postmodernists- and perhaps even Nandy in this case- rest their hopes on a denial of history.
Maybe the previous point merits a little more elaboration. Several attempts have been made to make history more inclusive- be it the French Annales school aiming at “total history” or the works of Hobsbawm and Thompson diverting their focus on alternative actors of history. The subaltern school of Guha also falls in this category. Yet, they all fail in some respects to include the subaltern. The reason, as Vineet mentions, lies in the ontology of history that locates the subaltern outside of the gambit of the discipline. Dipesh Chakrabarty illustrates the point well through his criticism of Guha’s readings of the subaltern in “Minority histories, subaltern pasts”. The discipline of history is methodologically tied to a certain understanding of rationality. Therefore, in his “The Prose of Counter-Insurgency” study of the Santal rebellion of 1855, although Guha sought to include the Santal’s consciousness of ascribing their insurgent action to the Santal god “Thakur” as a narrative about rebellion; by juxtaposing that supernatural “consciousness” against Reason, he ended up distancing his historian self from the object of his research. “Guha’s position with respect to the Santal’s own understanding of the event becomes a combination of the anthropologist’s politeness- ‘I respect your beliefs but they are not mine’- and a Marxist (or modern) sense of frustration with the intrusion of the supernatural into public life”. Such subaltern pasts, unless they are adequately anthropologised (i.e. made into an object of anthropological analysis) invariably remain outside the disciplinary confines of historical narratives. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak further outlines the multiplicity of issues one encounters when attempting to “re-present” the subaltern in “Can the Subaltern Speak?”
It is in this light that Nandy and others talk of denial of history. What they have in mind are forms free from the disciplinary confines of history- oral histories, histories through myths, lores, films or fiction- for, every fact is as good as fiction.
Owing to my handicapped knowledge of history, I must confess that I do not know what “rationalized history” means, and would appreciate it if someone explains the concept further. From Vineet’s post I gather that he ascribes it to the discipline of history rather than folks, myths et al. In this context, perhaps it is intellectually worthwhile to take note of what the contradictory voices say. For example, Judith Butler and Gayatri Spivak in their book “Who Sings the Nation State?” refer to Simon Gikandi who saw narratives as often being the base of genocides- like, Israel using an ancient religious narrative to justify its colonial atrocities. In view of the destructive potential of “a mythopoetic notion of history”, Gikandi owes his allegiance to written history as a safe thing. On my part, I am not the least acquainted with Gikandi’s work. However, it would be very enriching to read what more enlightened commentators/bloggers have to say about history and the debates circling it.
ReplyDeleteGreat work Kasturi. I think, your intervention here has saved me from becoming increasingly obscure in my writing. You have expanded on the concept much more lucidly and intellectually than I have, and all credit to you for placing all of it in the context of the subaltern studies literature. My term 'rationalised history' was used only to refer to the closeness of history and rationality. I would have elaborated more over here, but for the lack of time and also for the lack of having read a great amount on the subject (only some readings here and there), I would rather not blabber much. But I am sure others have interesting views on the topic too.
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